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China’s exchange rate and monetary policies 
Wang Xiaoyi
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1. Chinese  economic  growth maintains good momentum and the 
exchange rate shows increasing flexibility  
In 2010, the global economy continued to recover, but the road to recovery was uneven and 
fragile. The Chinese government strengthened the macro-adjustment policy, and the 
Chinese economy maintained good momentum, growing by 10.3%. 
During the global financial crisis, mainland China experienced capital outflows as a result of 
the contagion effect. In the fourth quarter of 2008 alone, the capital outflow amounted to 
USD 41 billion. Facing turbulence in the global financial market, especially the G7 currency 
market, the Chinese monetary authority adopted a prudential approach of narrowing the 
band of the renminbi’s exchange rate against the US dollar so as to stabilise the domestic 
financial market, mitigate the impact of the global crisis and maintain market confidence. This 
has helped to curb the volatility of cross-border capital flows.  
As far as international banks in mainland China are concerned, there are more than 
100 foreign-funded banks, accounting for roughly 2% of total banking sector assets. They are 
too small to play as influential a role in the financial system as they do in other emerging 
markets, especially after the global financial crisis, in which most of them suffered great 
losses. On the other hand, most domestic banks are currently in good shape, with sound 
capital adequacy, after issuing stocks in 2010. Nevertheless, the rapid expansion of credit, 
and the introduction of the Basel III Framework, will require banks to raise new capital next 
year. 
In 2010, China’s balance of payments posted a total surplus of USD 471 billion, with 
USD  306 billion in the current account and USD 166 billion in the capital and financial 
account.
2 Both China’s foreign trade and its cross-border capital flows picked up steadily in 
2010. As a result, the total volume exceeded the historical peak reached in 2008, before the 
global crisis erupted. 
On the other hand, the balance of payments fluctuated significantly last year. In the first 
quarter, the increase in goods imports was significantly higher than the increase in exports, 
the current account surplus decreased and there was a large surplus in the capital and 
financial account. In the second quarter, the current account surplus increased again, 
exceeding the first quarter increase. But as a result of the European sovereign debt crisis, 
net inflows under the capital and financial account slowed down. The third quarter saw a 
recovery of the trade surplus, and the worry about Europe reversed in the fourth quarter, 
when capital inflows surged. 
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With the global crisis fading away, the first half of 2010 saw the global economy move 
steadily onto the path of recovery, and the market gradually regain confidence. Accordingly, 
in mid-June 2010, China relaunched the exchange rate mechanism reform, expanding the 
flexibility of the renminbi, to better adjust it to external factors. From 20 June 2010 to the end 
of the year, the daily fluctuation of the currency’s spot exchange rate against the US dollar 
over USD-CNY central parity was 0.16%, with a maximum of 0.5%, and the daily volatility of 
the spot exchange rate averaged 0.17%, sometimes reaching as high as 0.75%. At the end 
of 2011, the USD-CNY central parity closed at 6.6227, an appreciation of 3.1% from end-
2009, or an annual rate of 6%. 
Chart 2 
CNY exchange rate flexibility 
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In terms of the effective exchange rate, the renminbi was also on track to appreciate in the 
first half of 2010. According to the BIS, the renminbi’s nominal effective exchange rate 
(NEER) index reached 117.42 in June 2010, an overall appreciation of 5.1% from end-2009, 
8.6% from June 2008, prior to the outbreak of the global financial crisis, and 18.5% from the 
exchange rate regime reform in July 2005. The renminbi’s real effective exchange rate 
(REER) reached 119.05 in June 2010, an overall appreciation of 3.4% from end-2009, 8.2% 
from June 2008 and 21.7% from the exchange rate regime reform in June 2005. 
However, the second half of 2010 witnessed a slightly different picture, in which the global 
foreign exchange market gradually priced in the Federal Reserve’s second round of 
quantitative easing, igniting the depreciation of the US dollar, with the US Dollar Index (DXY) 
declining by 9% to 79 at year-end. As a result, the renminbi’s NEER climbed to 113.74 at the 
end of 2010, an appreciation of 1.8% compared to end-2009. On the other hand, China’s 
inflation began accelerating quickly in the second half of 2010, fuelled by the global rise in 
food and commodity prices. It peaked at around 5%, year on year, at end-2010. As a result, 
the renminbi’s REER, increasing by 4.7% for the whole year, appreciated faster than the 
NEER. In fact, the REER has appreciated by 23.2% since the launching of the exchange rate 
mechanism reform in July 2005. Therefore, measured by the REER, the renminbi is near its 
historical peak, and hence is nearer to equilibrium than at any time since the launching of the 
exchange rate mechanism reform. 
Chart 3 
CNY NEER and REER, 1994−2010 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements. 
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2.  The gradual approach in reforming the CNY exchange rate 
mechanism works with China’s economic system 
Why did the Chinese authorities take a gradual approach to reforming the exchange rate 
mechanism and not let the exchange rate float freely? The answer can be summarised as 
follows: 
First, a free-floating exchange rate regime is usually applied to countries that issue reserve 
currency, which helps to immunise their domestic firms against exchange rate risk. Second, 
empirical studies show that the random walk behaviour of G7 currencies cannot be rejected. 
Third, China’s foreign trade has two different components, namely, processing trade, which 
is dominated by foreign-funded enterprises, and general trade, which is traditionally carried 
out by small and medium-sized domestic firms. The enterprises in the first group enjoy a 
surplus equivalent to around 140% of the total trade surplus, while those in the second group 
run a deficit equivalent to 40% of the total trade surplus. Thus, the export enterprises 
specialising in general trade need a transition period in which to absorb the impact of 
appreciation. Fourth, the banks need time to acquire risk management expertise and to build 
the necessary infrastructure under the new exchange rate environment, and more hedging 
instruments have to be designed and introduced into the foreign exchange market. In short, it 
takes time to prepare for structural and financial reform, so as not to endanger expectations 
and domestic demand in these sensitive and fragile post-crisis conditions. 
China has not fully liberalised the capital account, as can be seen from the wide gap 
between the onshore and offshore forward markets. By the end of June 2010, the US dollar 
discounts in the onshore and offshore CNY forward markets were equivalent to 0.7% and 
2.7%, respectively, down 0.2 percentage points and up 0.1 percentage point from end-2009. 
Therefore, with the support of other government policies, the central bank can sustain a real 
exchange rate target in the medium term. However, it must be kept in mind that China’s 
business cycle is much longer than that in advanced economies and in other emerging 
economies. 
Chart 4 
Prices in the onshore and offshore CNY forward markets 
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In 2010, China’s external balance improved for the third consecutive year. The current 
account balance as a percentage of GDP was 5.2%, down 5 percentage points from the 
peak in 2007. Taking into account the ongoing structural reform designed to boost domestic 
demand through measures such as improving the social security system, as well as 
strengthening the enforcement of environmental regulations, China will rebalance its 
economy further in the future. 
Chart 5 
China’s current account balance and its ratio to GDP 
 
As far as the integrated monetary and exchange rate policy framework is concerned, 
monetary conditions are a useful tool for coordinating monetary and exchange rate policies. 
In practice, inflation and exchange rate appreciation are alternatives in terms of cooling down 
the economy. However, it is helpful to look at the bigger picture, including the international 
monetary system (which, as mentioned above, is unfair to emerging economies), domestic 
structural factors, capital controls and the stage of development of financial markets, 
especially the foreign exchange market. 
The notion of long-run equilibrium exchange rates is helpful in formulating monetary policy 
strategy. Nevertheless, there are doubts about how far into the future a rational person can 
see. In practice, the assessment of long-run equilibrium exchange rates is more of an art 
than a science. This is an especially difficult task for China, as a fast-growing economy in 
transition. Different evaluations of the renminbi’s equilibrium exchange rate diverge from one 
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3. Multiple  options  for policy instruments to sterilise the abundant 
liquidity and stabilise the financial system 
As mentioned above, the total balance of payments surplus in 2010 amounted to 
USD  470  billion. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) conducted sterilisation operations, 
mainly by raising the reserve requirement ratio, issuing central bank notes to commercial 
banks, and hiking the interest rate. The reserve requirement ratio climbed to the historical 
peak of 19% and is expected to go on climbing. By the end of 2010, the PBOC’s total assets 
increased to CNY 2.45 trillion, and M2 expanded to CNY 7.23 trillion, up 19.7%. As a result 
of the stimulus package and abundant liquidity, commercial banks have more incentives to 
expand their domestic lending. The PBOC has taken many measures to deal with abundant 
liquidity, and its monetary policy stance has also shifted from relatively loose to prudent. 
China has not liberalised control over foreign purchase of domestic debt securities issued by 
the central bank for sterilisation. The foreign-funded banks in mainland China have large 
interests in the central bank notes, investing 30% of their bond portfolio in them because they 
are benchmark assets and share high liquidity. 
To cope with the dilemma facing the central bank, the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE) is also exploring ways to deepen the reform of the foreign exchange 
management system. The SAFE is now improving the verification system for trade receipts 
and payments, abolishing the remittance requirement for export receipts and eliminating 
supervisory loopholes. Furthermore, China will continue to develop the foreign exchange 
market so as to provide domestic investors with the tools to hedge exchange rate exposures. 
Measures to cool down the housing sector, which has attracted large capital flows, have 
been announced in order to reduce distortions and risks. These measures include 
requirements relating to higher down payments on mortgages, higher real interest rates on 
speculative purchases, and a real estate tax to raise real estate holding costs. 
In addition to these measures, there are some other policy alternatives to be considered. 
First, macroprudential policy packages can be explored to help address the system-wide 
challenges posed by external factors. For instance, measures to dampen the procyclical 
effects of capital flows are now under consideration.  
Second, widening outbound investment channels and simplifying approval procedures can 
encourage capital outflows and reduce imbalances over time, provide for a more efficient 
allocation of resources, curb expansion of the domestic money supply, and contribute to 
domestic financial stability. 
Third, further financial deepening can enhance the domestic capacity to allocate investments 
to more productive uses and avoid asset price bubbles. Greater progress can be achieved in 
broadening investment categories, improving market liquidity and strengthening regulatory 
oversight.  
Fourth, a shift to prudent fiscal policies can help to mitigate the dilemma facing the central 
bank. In addition, the early warning framework for monitoring capital inflows and outflows can 
be improved. 